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THE MEASURE OF RECOVERY UPON IMPLIED
AND QUASI-CONTRACTS
The term, "implied contract," is an ambiguous one; for it may
mean a real agreement of parties, which, however, is not ex-
pressed in words, but is understood by both parties from the
circumstances, or it may mean a claim, equitable in its nature,
to get back something which, if the holder were to keep it, would
result in unjustly enriching him. The amount of recovery upon
an implied contract, so called, may therefore be governed by the
ordinary rules applied to an express contract, or it may be
determined according to the justice or injustice of the defendant's
claim to retain a benefit. A somewhat careful analysis of the
cases is therefore necessary in order to arrive at a satisfactory
settlement of the measure of damages. For this purpose, the
cases may be divided into four classes:
I. Where there is an express contract substantially per-
formed.
2. Where there is an express contract unperformed.
3. Where an express contract has been rescinded.
4. Where there never was an express contract.
I.
EXPRESS CONTRACT SUBSTANTIALLY PERFORMED.
Where a contractor, performing his contract in good faith,
substantially complies with his obligation, but makes some com-
paratively slight deviations, he may recover compensation for the
work done.' While there is general agreement on this point
among the authorities, the rule for determining the amount of
recovery is very differently stated by the different courts. The
rule most commonly laid down is that the contractor may recover
' He cannot, strictly speaking, recover on the special contract, and
therefore if the original obligation was in the form of a covenant, an
action of covenant will not lie on substantial performance. Clayton v.
Blake, 4 Ired. (N. C.), 497.
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the contract price, less an allowance for the damage caused by the
deviation.
2
This rule is often stated more specifically in this form-that
where performance substantially conforms to the contract, but
varies in some particulars from the specifications, the amount to
be deducted from the contract price is the reasonable cost of
remedying such defects as are remediable without unreasonable
expenditure,3 and so far as the defects cannot be remedied, the
diminished value of the performance, compared with complete
performance.4  It is often held, however, that the measure of
2 The Lucille Manor, 70 Fed. 233, Springfield Milling Co. v. Barnard
& Leas Manuf. Co., 81 Fed. Rep., 261, 26 C. C. A., 389; Barkalow v.
Pfeiffer, 38 Ind., 214; Aetna Iron & Steel Works v. Kossuth County, 79
Ia., 40, 44 N. W. 2,5; Bassett v. Sanborn, 9 Cush. (Mass.), 58; Gleason
v. Smith, 9 Cush., 484, 57 Am. Dec. 62; Kenworthy v. Stevens, 232 Mass.,
123; Norwood v. Lathrop, 178 Mass., 208, 59 N. E. Rep., 65o; Leeds v.
Little, 42 Minn., 414, 44 N. W., 3og; Yeats v. Ballentine, 56 Mo., 53o;
Decker v. School Dist., 74 S. W. 390; Bozarth v. Dudley, 44 N. J. L., 3o4,
43 Am. Rep. 373; Feeney v. Bardsley, 66 N. J. L., 239, 49 At. Rep., 443;
Phillip v. Gallant, 62 N. Y., 256; Woodward v. Fuller, So N. Y., 312;
Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y., 648; Smith v. Gugerty, 4 Barb., 614; Sin-
clair v. Tallmage, 35 Barb., 6o2; Goldsmith v. Hand, 26 Ohio St., ioi;
Johnson v. Slaymaker, 18 Ohio Ct. Ct., 2O4; Chambers v. Jaynes, 4 Pa.,
39; Danville Bridge Co. v. Pomroy, 15 Pa., 151; Truesdale v. Watts, 12
Pa., 73; Wade v. Haycock, 25 Pa., 382; Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. 492, 23
Atl. Rep., 243; White v. Braddock Borough School Dist., 159 Pa., 201, 28
Atl. Rep., 136; Shires v. O'Connor, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 465; Aldrich v. Wil-
marth, 3 S. D., 523, 54 N. W. Rep., 811 ; Bishop v. Price, 24 Wis,, 480. It
is generally held that the burden of bringing in evidence of the damage
caused by the deviation is on the defendant. Fitts v. Reinhart, 102 Iowa,
311, 71 N. W. Rep. 227; Leeds v. Little, 42 Minn., 414, 44 N. W. Rep.
3o9; Filbert v. Phila., 181 Pa., 530, 37 Atl. 545. In Massachusetts, how-
ever, the burden appears to be on the plaintiff. Gillis v. Cobe, 177 Mass.,
584, 59 N. E. Rep. 455. In a few cases full recovery of the contract price
upon substantial performance appears to have been allowed, but the
court was probably not dealing with the question of reduction. Linch v.
Paris Lumber & Grain Elevator Co., 8o Tex., 23;, 15 S. W. Rep. 208.
3 Cutler v. Close, 5 C. & P., 337; Pinches v. Swedish Lutheran Church,
55 Conn., 183, io Atl. 264; Keeler v. Herr, 157 Ill., 57, 41 N. E., 75o;
Walker v. Orange, 16 Gray, 193; Sheldon v. Leahy, iii Mich., 29, 69 N.
W. Rep. 76; Leeds v. Little, 42 Minn., 414, 44 N. W., 3o9; Haysler v.
Owen, 6 Mo., 270; Crouch v. Gutmann, 134 N. Y., 45, 32 N. E. Rep., 271;
Pallman v. Smith, 135 Pa., 188; Shires v. O'Connor, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 465;
Ashland, L. S. & C. Co. v. Shores, io5 Wis., 122, 8i N. W. 136.
4 Cullen v. Sears, 112 Mass., 299; Eaton v. Gladwell, 121 Mich., 444,
449, So N. W. Rep., 211; Morton v. Harrison, 52 N. Y. Super. Ct. 3o5;
Ashland, L. S. & C. Co. v. Shores, 105 Wis., 122, 81 N. W., 136.
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recovery is the value of the performance,
5 or the amount of
benefit conferred on the defendant ;f though in every case where
the point is raised it is of course held that this recovery cannot
exceed the contract price,7 to the benefit of which the defendant
has a right," deducting therefrom the damages for non-perform-
ance.
9
The true doctrine appears to be that recovery can in no case
exceed the contract price, less proper allowance for the defective
performance; nor on the other hand can it exceed the benefit
conferred.'0 Since the plaintiff has not exactly performed his
contract, he cannot justly claim the benefit of any profit that
would have come to him by performing it; and on the other band
the defendant is entitled to be left in no worse position than he
would have occupied had the contract been performed, and
therefore should be held to pay no more than the contract price,
less the allowance for non-performance.
Without considering whether the work done on the contract
amounts to substantial completion of it, the contracting party
may nevertheless recover, without establishing substantial per-
formance, by showing an acceptance of his work by the other
party. In that case the contractor is entitled to compensation as
5 Woodruff v. Hough, 91 U. S., 596; Pinches v. Swedish Lutheran
Church, 55 Conn., 183, lO Atl. 264; Morford v. Ambrose, 3 J. J. Marsh.,
688; Norris v. School Dist., 12 Me., 293, 28 Am. Dec., 182; Veasie it.
Bangor, 51 Me., 509; Smith v. First Cong. Meeting House, 8 Pick, 178;
Lord v. Wheeler, i Gray, 282; Atkins v. Barnstable, 97 Mass., 428; Pow-
ell v. Howard, io9 Mass. 192; Allen v. McKibbin, 5 Mich., 449; Wildey
v. School Dist., 25 Mich., 419; Phelps v. Beebe, 71 Mich., 554, 39 N. W.,
761; Williams v. Porter, 5I Mo., 441; Freeman v. Aylor, 62 Mo. App.,
613; Decker v. School Dist., 74 S. W., 38o; Newman v. McGregor, 5
Ohio, 349, 24 Am. Dec., 293.
6 Bertrand v. Byrd, 5 Ark., 651; Walsh v. Jenvey, 85 Md., 240; 36 At.,
817; Bassett v. Sanborn, 9 Cush. 58; Cardwell v. Bridge, 9 Allen, 355;
Norwood v. Lathrop, 178 Mass., 208, 59 N. E. Rep., 65o.
7Pinches v. Swedish Lutheran Church, 55 Conn., 183, IO At., 264;
Morford v. Ambrose, 3 J. J; Marsh, 688; Walsh v. Jenvey, 85 Md., 24o,
36 Aft. Rep. 817; Atkins v. Barnstable, 97 Mass., 192.
"Aetna L. & L Works v. Kossuth County, 79 Ia., 40, 44 N. W., 215.
9 Escott v. White, io Bush (Ky.) i69; Allen v. McKibbin, 5 Mich., 449;
Wildey v. School Dist., 25 Mich., 419; Phelps v. Beebe, 71 Mich., 554, 39
N. W. Rep., 761; Freeman v. Aylor, 62 Mo. App., 613; Decker v. School
Dist., 74 S. W. Rep., 39o.
10 Gillis v. Cobe, 177 Mass., 584, 59 N. E. Rep., 455; Yeats v. Ballen-
tine, 56 Mo., 530.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
he would be if he proved substantial performance. If the accept-
ance was involuntary or caused only by the necessity of the
case, as for instance, where it consisted of building a house or
other structure upon land, the owner, by using the fruits of the
work, does not accept it, since he cannot make use of his own
land without enjoying the fruits of the work; and his doing so
is no waiver of the right to claim that the contract was not per-
formed.11
The courts are, however, acute to find acceptance even in such
cases and any act of approval is sufficient for the purpose. The
measure of damages in this class of cases is the value of the
work,"2 not exceeding the contract price,'3 with the right in the
defendant to recoup damages for non-performance.' 4 But the
contractor is under no circumstances entitled to a profit which he
would have realized if he had complied with his engagement. 5
II.
EXPRESS CONTRACT UNPERFORMED.
Where the contract is on its face an entire one, and has been
performed only in part, a substantial portion of the contract being
left unperformed, or where after substantial performance the
contractor wilfully and without excuse abandons further per-
formance, the contractor, thus having deliberately failed to carry
" Munro v. Butt, 8 El. and BI., 738; English v. Wilson, 34 Ala., 201;
Bertrand v. Byrd, 5 Ark., 65i; Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal., 96; J. M.
Griffith Co. v. Los Angeles, 54 Pac., 383; Morford v. Mastin, 6 T. B. Mon.,
6og, 17 Am. Dec., 188; Yeats v. Ballentine, 56 Mo., 530; Bozarth v. Dud-
ley, 44 N. J. L., 304, 43 Am. Rep., 373; Eldridge v. Rowe, 7 Ill., 9r; Lowe
v. Sinklear, 27 Mo., 308.
.2 Merriweather v. Taylor, 15 Ala., 735; Hawkins v. Gilbert, ig Ala., 54;
Bell v. Teague, 85 Ala., 21r, 3 So. Rep., 86i; Simpson v. McDonald, 2
Ark., 370; McClure v. Secrist, 5 Ind., 31; Williams v. Porter, 51 Mo.,
441; B. & 0. R. Co. v. Lafferty, 2 W. Va., 104; Taylor v. Williams, 6
Wis., 363.
23 Walsh v. lenvey, 85 Md. 240, 36 Atl. Rep., 817; Farmer v. Francis,
12 Ired. (N. C.), 282; Eaton v. Gladwell, 121 Mich., 444, go N. W. 292.
On acceptance plaintiff may recover recouping damages.
'14 Dermott v. Jones, 23 How., 22o, L. ed.; Sheppard v. Dowling, IO3
Ala., 563, I5 So. Rep., 846; Bush v. Finucane, 8 Colo., 192, 6 Pac. Rep.,
514; Adlard v. Muldoon, 45 Ill., 193; Estep v. Fenton, 66 Ill., 467; Epper-
ly v. Bailey, 3 Ind., 72; Barkalow v. Pfeiffer, 38 Ind., 214; Jewett v.
Weston, 'I Me., 346; Bee Printing Co. v. Hichborn, 4 All., 63; Phelps vt.
Beebe, 71 Mich., 554;Keith v,. Ridge, 146 Mo., 9o, 47 S. W., 904; Horn v.
Batchelder, 41 N. H., 86; Pullman v. Corning, 9 N. Y., 93; Barker v.
Troy & Rutland R. R. Co., 27 Vt., 766.
15 Garland v. New Orleans, 13 La. Ann., 43.
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out his undertaking, has no equitable claim to any compensation
whatever, and in most jurisdictions is allowed to recover.
nothing.' In some jurisdictions, however, following the cele-
brated case of Britton v. Turner,17 the contractor is allowed to
recover some compensation for the work he has done. 8
16 2 Sedg. Dam. 8th Ed., Sect. 659. This is the case when there is a
voluntary abandonment of the contract without excuse: Hansbrough v.
Beck, 5 Wall., 497, 18 L. ed., 520; Hawkins v. Gilbert, ig Ala., 54; Golden
Gate Lumber Co. v. Sahrbacher, io5 Cal., 114, 38 Pac., 635; Demead v.
Coburn, 15 Md. 29; Homer v. Shaw, 177 Mass., I, 58 N. E. Rep., i6o;
Jennings z. Camp, 13 Johns. 94, 7 Am. Dec., 367; Brown v. Weber, 38
N. Y., 187; Glacius v. Black, 5o N. Y., 145, 1o Am. Rep., 449; Crane v.
Knubel, 61 N. Y., 645; Cunningham v. Jones, 4 Abb. Pr., 433. Or where
the work is completed, but fails in some substantial particular to comply
with the requirements of the contract: Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt., 52;
Whitaker v. Dunn, 3 T. L. Rep., 6o2; Elliott v. Caldwell, 43 Minn., 357,
45 N. W. Rep., 845, 9 L. R. A., 52; Bozarth v. Dudley, 44 N. J. L., 304,
43 Am. Rep., 373; Feeney v. Bardsley, 66 N. J. L., 239, 49 Aft. Rep., 443;
Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y., 173, 72 Am. Dec., 442; Glacius v: Black, 5o
N. Y., 145, IO Am. Rep., 449; Mehurin v. Stone, 37 Ohio St., 49; Shires v.
O'Connor, 4 Pa. Super. Ct, 465; Hulst v. Benevolent Hall Assoc., 9 S. D.,
144, 68 N. W. Rep., 200; Sherlock v. Powell, 25 Ont. App., 407. It seems
that if the contractor upon abandonment forfeits his right to compensa-
tion, this is an end to rights on the contract for either party. The owner
cannot sue the contractor for damages for non-performance without mak-
ing allowance for the work done by the contractor. Griffin v. Miner, 54
N. Y. Super. Ct, 46.
7 6 N. H., 481.
1s2 Sedg. Dam., 8th ed., Sect. 66o. The cases in which this doctrine is
laid down are usually cases where the work was com pleted, but there
were serious defects in it. Heman v. Compton Hill Imp. Co., 58 Mo. App.,
480; Muller v. Gillick, 66 Mo. App., 500; Danforth v. Freeman, 69 N. H.,
466, 43 At., 621; Cox v. Estell, Peck (Tenn.), 175; Twitty v. McGuire,
3 Murph. (Tenn.), 5oi; Elliott v. Wilkinson, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.), 411; Porter
v. Woods, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 56, 39 Am. Dec. 153; Gibson v. Carlin, 13
Lea (Tenn.), 44o; Deberry v. Young, i Tenn. Cas., 5i; Bush v. Jones,
2 Tenn. Cas., 224; Gonzales College v. McHigh, 21 Tex., 256. But in
many States, the plaintiff is alowed to recover if his work has been of
actual benefit to the defendant, even though he has intentionally aban-
doned the work before completion and without excuse.. Walworth v.
Finnegan, 33 Ark., 751; Jewett v. Weston, ix Me., 346; Norris v. School
Dist., 12 Me., 293, 28 Am. Dec., 182; Porter v. Woods, 3 Humph., 56, 39
Am. Dec., 153; Hillyard v. Crabtree, ii Tex., 264, 62 Am. Dec., 475; Gon-
zales College v. McHugh, 21 Tex., 256; Carroll v. Welch, 26 Tex., 147;
Watson v. DeWitt County, 19 Tex. Civ. App., 150, 46 S. W., io6i; B. &
0. R. R. Co. v. Lafferty, 2 W. Va., 1O4. The rule is otherwise in Vermont
Pnd Kentucky which, nevertheless, accept the doctrine of Britton v. Turner
in cases where the abandonment was not wilful. Austin v. Austin, 47 Vt.,




The term "Rescission" should legally be confined to cases
where a contract is rightfully put an end to during the perform-
ance of it and before the performance is completed. This may
be done by mutual consent of the parties or it may under certain
circumstances be the act of one party alone. For instance, if
one party is induced to enter into a contract by the fraud of the
other party to it, he may avoid or rescind the contract. Even if
the contract was legally entered into, one party, according to
most authorities, may elect to rescind the contract if full per-
formance of it is prevented by the other party. Under some cir-
cumstances it has even been held that one party may rescind a
contract because of a breach of it by the other party, although
it is still entirely possible for the former to continue and com-
plete the performance on his side. In all these cases the rescis-
sion is legally accomplished because of a right given by law to
the rescinding party.
Rescission, properly so called, is sometimes confounded with
the repudiation of the contract by one party. This, however, is
an improper use of the term.
Whenever a party to the contract is given the right to rescind
because of a breach by the other party this is merely an optional
right. He may, if he choose, continue to claim his right to the
performance of the contract and may bring suit upon the special
agreement and recover damages for the breach of it, which will
include loss of profit if any can be proved. On the other hand,
if he choose, he may rescind the contract and claim the rights
which arise from rescission.'
If a party to a contract elects to rescind it he cannot then
continue to claim the benefits of the contract. He cannot go
on and perform it, nor can he claim compensation for loss of
profits of it. His election involves an abandonment of any
claim whatever to the performance of the contract and he can
make no other claim than for a return of the benefit conferred
19 Wilson v. Bauman, 8o Ill., 493; North v. Mallory, 94 Ind., 305, 51
AtI., 89; Thompson v. Gaffey, 52 Neb., 317, 72 N. W., 314; Derby v. John-
SOl;, 21 Vt., 17.
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by him.20 Consequently, where the non-payment of an installment
under a contract is held to justify rescission, a party cannot sue
for breach of the contract on such non-payment and recover for
loss of profits of the contract. If he chooses to keep the contract
alive, he must continue performance; but if he elects to regard
the contract as rescinded, he has no claim 
to the profits.
21
Upon the recission of a contract both parties to it have the
right to be replaced so far as that is possible in the condition 
in
which they were before performance of the contract began. 
In
other words, each side is entitled to a return of anything which
it has given to the other on account of the contract or in 
per-
formance of it. Since one of the parties is in the wrong, the other
party must be preferred on both sides of this return; and if 
a
complete return of the benefits on both sides cannot be made
without injustice to the wronged party, then the return must 
be
made to the rescinding party and not to the wrong-doing party.
In most cases, however, no difficulty will be found in securing 
a
return of benefits.
When the rescinding party to a contract has given property or
has performed services either in consideration for the contract 
or
in partial performance of it, he is entitled upon rescission, as 
has
been seen, to a return of the property or the services. In case
of property this return can often be made in specie. In case 
of
service there can be no return in specie. Where no return can
be made of the exact benefit conferred, the plaintiff is entitled
to recover in an action on a quantum meruit or quantum valebat,
the value of the services conferred
22 or the property given
23 in
20 Therefore, if the plaintiff continues performance after his right to
rescind accrues, he cannot afterward change his mind, and 
claim to re-
cover on a quantum ineruit. Meyer v. Hallock, 2 Robert (N. 
Y.), 284;
Shaw v. Turnpike, 3 P. & W. (Pa.), 445.
21 Cox v. McLaughlin, 54 Cal., 605; Christian County v. Oveholt, 
i8 Ill.,
223; Beatty v. Howe Lumber Co., 77 Minn., 272, 79 N. W. Rep., 1013;
Wharton v. Winch, 14o N. Y., 287, 35 N. E. Rep., 589; Jones . N. Y., 57
App. Div., 403, 68 N. Y. Supp., 228.
22Britt v. Hays, 21 Ga., 157; Selby v. Hutchinson, 9 Ill., 319; Webster v.
Enfield, io Ill., 298; Dobbins v. Higgins, 78 Ill., 440; Wilson v. Bauman,
80 Ill., 493; Marquis v. Lauretson, 76 Ia., 23; Thompson 
v. Brown, io6
Iowa, 367, 67 N. W. Rep., 8ig; Black v. Woodrow, 39 Md., i94; Bush 
v.
Brooks, 70 Mich., 446, 38 N. W. Rep., 562; Simmons v. Ocean Causeway,
21 App. Div., 30, 47 N. Y. Supp., 360; Hardiman v. Mayor, 21 App. 
Div.,
614, 47 N. Y. Supp., 786; Green v. Haley, R. I., 260; Preble v. Bottom,
27 Vt., 249; Fitch v. Casey, 2 G. Greene (Ia.), 300.
23 Bennett v. Phelps, 12 Minn., 326.
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lieu of a return in specie; and since this is not a suit on the con-
tract, but merely a recovery of the benefit conferred by perform-
ance for the purpose of replacing the parties in their original
position, the contract price is immaterial,24 and so is the value
of the services to the defendant.2 But the cost to the plaintiff
may be shown as evidence of the value.26 In a few States, how-
ever, the courts, overlooking the consideration that this is not a
suit for breach of contract, but to recover for goods delivered
or services rendered, on a consideration failed, hold that the
recovery must be at the contract rate,27 or at least cannot exceed
the contract price, 28 unless the circumstances are such as to show
that the expense of the part performance was greater than the
average expense of full performance.2  This amounts to giving
the defendant the benefit of the contract which by his default it
is agreed that the plaintiff has a right to destroy. Where the
contract is divisible, so that a contract price is named for each
of several acts of performance, and some of the acts have been
completed before rescission, the contract price alone is recover-
able for these acts; the value of the performance cannot be
demanded.80
When the contract contains a clause permitting one party to
cancel it upon notice to the other, and the contract is so can-
celled after part performance, the party who has partly performed
24 Fitch v. Casey, 2 G. Greene (Ia.), 30o; Roderner v. Hazelhurst, 9
Gill, 288; North v. Mallory, 94 Md., 305. 5i AtI., 89; Connolly v., Sullivan,"
53 N. E. 143; Hemminger v. Western Assur. Co., 95 Mich., 355. 54 N. W.
Rep. 949; Thompson v. Gaffey, 52 Neb., 317, 72 N. W. Rep., 314; Merrill
v. Ithaca & 0. R. R. Co., i6 Wend. (N. Y.), 586; (Cf. Koon v. Green-
man, 7 Wend. (N. Y.), 121); Derby v. Johnson, 21 Vt., 17.25 San Francisco Bridge Co. v. Dumbarton Land & Imp. Co., II9 Cal.,
272, 51 Pac., 335.
26 Simmons v. Ocean Causeway, 21 App. Div., 30, 47 N. Y. Supp., 360.
27 Reynolds v. Jourdan, 6 Cal., Io8; Wiegel v. Boone, 64 Ark., 228, 41
S. W. Rep., 763; Chicago Training School v. Davies, 64 Ill. App., 503;
Rice v. Partello, 88 Il. App., 52; Hoyle v. Stellwagen, 28 Ind. App., 681,
63 N. E. Rep., 780; Kehoe v. Rutherford, 56 N. J. L., 23, 27 AtI. Rep., 912.
28 Folliott v. Hunt, 21 Ill., 654; Steinburg v. Gebhadt, 41 Mo., 519.
20 Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co., 57 Ohio St., 182, 48 N. E.,
888 (agreement to buy coal for a year at a certain rate; after coal had
been received during the period of highest price, buyer repudiated; seller
may recover for portion delivered at market rate).
30Marquis v. Lauretson, 75 Ia., 23; Rodemer v. Hazelhurst, 9 Gill (Md.),
288. See Wiegel v. Boone, 64 Ark., 228, 41 S. W., 763.
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may recover compensation for the work he has done at the con-
tract rate.81
When a contract is rescinded after part performance by the
mutual consent of the parties, a party who has partially per-
formed the contract may in the ordiiaary case recover the value
of such performance according to the contract price; the amount
recoverable depending upon the ratio of the value of the labor
and materials actually furnished to the total value of all the
labor and materials which would have been required for the
performance of the contract . 2 If, however, the circumstances of
the rescission are such as to make it clear that neither party was
to have compensation, this will not be allowed. So when the
plaintiff, who had contracted to build a mill, built it so badly that
it was entirely useless, and by agreement of the parties the mill
was entirely- rebuilt, the builder was allowed to recover nothing
for the first building, but was restricted to compensation for the
rebuilding.88
Rescission of a contract may take place by an act of the law
or by inevitable accident. In that case, also, recovery may be had
for the work done before the rescission.
Where by a change of law during the progress of the work the
completion of a contract made is impossible, the contractor may re-
cover at the contract rate for the work already done.
34 And so
when the full performance of work is prevented by an injunction,
recovery may be had for the part performed before the injunc-
81 Chicago v. Sexton, 115 Ill., 230, 2 N. E., 263; Fitzgerald v. Allen, 128
Mass., 232; Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y., 489, 44 N. E. Rep., 167. In
Lyman v. Lincoln, 38 Neb., 794, 57 N. W., 531, however, where the city
cancelled a contract to build an engine house under a power reserved
to it in the contract, it was held that it could not thereafter use the
contract price for the purpose of diminishing plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff
is entitled to recover the amount of actual benefit which the city received
independently of the terms of the contract.
32 Charlestoh Ice Manuf. Co. v. Joyce, 63 Fed. Rep., 916, II C. C. A.,
496; Schillo v. McEwen, go Ill., 77; McAfferty v. Hale, 24 Ia., 355; Con-
nolly v. Sullivan, 53 N. E., 143; Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Dubois, 15
Wend., 87, affirming Dubois v. C. Co., 12 Wend., 334; Farmer v. Francis,
12 Ire. (N. C.), 282.
88 Simpson v. McDonald, 2 Ark., 37o.
8 Jlones v. Judd, 4 N. Y., 41; Heine v. Meyer, 6I N. Y., 171, 2o Am.
Rep., 475.
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tion was issued at the contract rate, or at least according to
the value of the services rendered.35
When one undertakes to do work upon the property of another,
and before the completion of the work the property is destroyed
by act of God, the contractor is entitled to recover compensation
for the work he has done.36 So where a contractor undertakes
to do work on the defendant's building, and the building is blown
down before completion of the work, the contractor may recover
compensation for his work,37 and if both sides of the contract
have been partly executed before the destruction, compensation
may be recovered on both sides for what has been done.38  So
where one is to make repairs on the house of another under a
special contract, or is to furnish a part of the work and materials
used in the erection of a house, and his contract becomes im-
possible of performance on account of the destruction of the
house by fire, he may recover for what he has done or finished.39
And on the same principle recovery may be had for labor and
materials where the plaintiff had undertaken to install a heating
35 Whitfield v. Zellnor, 24 Miss., 663; Theobald v. Burleigh, 66 N. H.,
574, 23 Atl. Rep., 367; Doolittle v. Nash, 48 Vt., 441.
36 See on this doctrine the cases subsequently cited in notes 7 to 14. The
opposite doctrine prevails in England. Appleby v. Myers, L. R. 2 C. P.,
65I (contract to put machinery into defendant's building). And see
Brumby v. Smith, 3 Ala., 123; Shanks v. Griffin, 14 B. Mon., 153. If it is
still possible to restore and complete the work the plaintiff must do so
before he will be entitled to recover compensation; as where he under-
takes to erect a building on land, and it is blown or burned down before
completion. The plaintiff is not thereby discharged from his obligation
to perform. Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill., 18; Adams v. Nichols, ig
Pick., 275, 31 Am. Dec., 137; Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y., 272, 82 Am.
Dec., 349; Galyon v. Ketchen, 85 Tenn., 55, 1 S. W., 508; Weis Z,. Dev-
lin, 67 Tex., 507, 3 S. W., 726, 6o Am. Rep., 38; School Trustees v.
Bennett, 27 N. J. L., 513, 72 Am. Dec., 373.
37 Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill., 18; Garretty v. Brazell, 34 Iowa, I0O.
38 Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass., 517, 27 N. E., 667, 25 Am. St. Rep,
654, 12 L. R. A., 571.
39 Rawson v. Clark, 70 Ill., 656; Cleery v. Schicr, 120 Mass., 210; But-
terfield v. Byron, 153 Mass.; 517, 27 N. E. Rep., 667, 25 Am. St., 654, 12
L. R. A., 571; Niblo v. Binsse, i Keyes, 476; Hayes v. Gross, 9 App. Div.,
12, 40 N. Y. Supp., iO98; Hollis v. Chapman, 36 Tex., i; Weis v. Devlin,
67 Tex., 507, 3 S. W. Rep., 726, 6o Am. Rep., 38; Hysell v. Sterling Coal
& Manuf. Co., 46 W. Va., 158, 33 S. E. Rep., 95; Cook v. McCabe, 53 Wis.,
250, 40 Am. Rep., 765, IO N. W. Rep., 507.
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or lighting plant in a building,
40 to move a building,
41 to build
a house from the defendant's materials,
42 to make gloves from
the defendant's materials,
43 or to repair the defendant's vessel,
44
and the building, the materials, or the vessel, are destroyed by fire
before complete performance.
According to the weight of authority, this recovery is to be
had at the contract rate, so far as this can be applied to the case.
45
In some States, however, the reasonable value of the work and
materials is to be recovered and not the pro rata portion of the
contract price. 46 Since neither party is in fault, neither has for-
feited the right to rely on the contract; and the better view,
therefore, is to allow recovery at the contract rate.
IV.
No EXPRESS CONTRACT.
Where work is done at request or without any express agree-
ment for payment, there is nevertheless understood by the parties,
though not expressed in words, an agreement to pay for the work
done. In that case the amount of recovery is the actual value of
the services rendered, not of the product of the services.
4
T Or
if it was a contract for the use of property, the amount of re-
covery is the value of the use.
48 If the contractor hired workmen
4o Kenwood Bridge Co. v. Dunderdale, 50 II. App., 581; Niblo v. Binsse,
I Keyes, 476.
41 Angus v. Scully, 176 Mass., 357, 57 N. E. Rep., 674, 49 L. R. A., 562.
42 Wilson v. Knott, 3 Humph., 473, 39 Am. Dec., 165.
43 Labowitz v. Frankfort, 4 N. Y. Misc., 275, 23 N. Y. Supp., 1O38.
44 Menetone v. Athawes, 3 Burr 1592.
45 Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill., 18; Rawson v. Clark, 7o Ill., 656; Clark
v. Busse, 82 Ill., 515; Butterfield v. Byron, '53 Mass., 517, 27 N. E. 667,
25 Am. St. Rep., 654, 12 L. R. A., 571; Niblo v. Binsse, 
i Keyes, 476;
Hayes v. Gross, 9 App. Div., 12, 4o N. Y. Supp., 1O98; Labowitz 
v. Frank-
fort, 4 N. Y. Misc., 275, 23 N. Y. Supp., io38; Hollis v. Chapman, 36 
Tex.,
i; Clark v. Franklin, 7 Leigh (Va.), i; Cook v. McCabe, 53 Wis., 250, TO
N. W., 507, 4o Am. Rep., 765.
46 Wilson v. Knott, 3 Humph. (Tenn.), 473, 39 Am. Dec., 165.
47 Charleston I. M. Co. v. Joyce, 63 Fed., 916, 11 C. C. A., 496 (boring
well); Ennis v. Pullman P. C. Co., Ill. 46 N. E., 439 (professional 
ser-
vices); Snow v. Ware, 13 Met. (Mass.), 42 (building road); Turner 
v.
Mason, 65 Mich., 662, 32 N. W., 846 (painting portrait). It is 
the net
value, deducting an allowance for defective workmanship. 
Wright V.
CuMpsty, 41 Pa., io2.
48 Adamson v. Adamson, 9 Ark., 25 (slaves).
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to do the work, the amount recoverable is not what he paid his
own workmen, but the value of their services.49
Where extra work is done outside an express contract, by
consent or at the request of the other party to the contract, the
party doing the work is entitled to recover the value of it. This
will be paid for in the ordinary case at a rate no greater than
the contract rate, if that can be traced.5 0 If, however, circum-
stances make the extra work more costly than it was at the time
the contract was entered into, the contract price ceases to be a
guide in estimating the compensation for the extra work.51
If the extra work is so different from the work provided for
in the contract that the prices named in the contract furnish no
proper guide to the value of the extra work, or if the nature of
the contract is so modified by the changes that the original prices
cannot be traced in the new work, the plaintiff may recover the
value of the work.52 Where, however, the recovery is based not
upon a real, though unexpressed contract, but upon an unjust
enrichment of the defendant; that is, where the cause of action
is in quasi-contract, the amount of recovery should strictly be
limited to the unjust enrichment conferred upon the defendant
by the plaintiff's labor. In many such cases the benefit conferred
on the defendant is the same as the value of the services of the
plaintiff. Thus where the plaintiff is entitled to recover money
paid under a mistake, or otherwise under circumstances giving
him a claim to get it back, the measure of recovery is the money
thus paid, with legal interest.5 s And where the plaintiff is en-
49Hauptman v. Catlin, i E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 729.
5 °Jones v. Woodbury, ii B. Mon. (Ky.), 167.51 Harrison Co. v. Byrne, 67 Ind., 21; Slusser v. Burlington, 47 Iowa,
3oo (hard pan); Turner v. Grand Rapids, 20 Mich., 39o (bad state ofweather); Dubois v. Delaware & H. C. Co., 12 Wend. (N. Y.), 334,
15 Wend., 87 (hard pan).
52 Charleston Ice Manuf. Co. v. Joyce, 63 Fed., 916, 1I C. C. A., 496;
Chicago R. R. v. Vosburgh, 46 IIl., 311; Western Union R. Co. v. Smith,75 II1., 496; Elgin v. Joslyn, 136 IIl., 525, _6 N. E. Rep., lo9o; Street v.Swain, 21 Ind., 2o3; Bailey v. Woods, 17 N. W. 365; Wheeden v. Fiske.So N. H., 125; Hollinshead v. Mactier, 13 Wend. (N. Y.), 276; Rhodes v.Clute, 17 Utah, 137, 53 Pac., g9o; Hood v. Smiley, 5 Wyo., 7o, 96 Pac., 856.53Deery v. Hamilton, 41 Ia., 16. If part of the amount paid really be-longed to the defendant, the plaintiff can recover the balance. Merchants'
Bank v. Bank of Commonwealth, 139 Mass., 513 (overpayment of check);Western Assur. Co. v. Towle, 65 Wis. 247 (overpayment of insurance
loss, owing to fraud of assured).
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titled to recover money reasonably paid out for the funeral ex-
penses of a person whom defendant was bound to bury, the
amount of money paid is the measure of recovery, as it is also
the measure of the enrichment.
5 4 So where plaintiff rendered
services in saving defendant's property from destruction, the
defendant's enrichment was the value of the services, and that
is the amount of recovery.
5 In a few cases, however, the amount
of the enrichment and the value of the services are not the same;
and in such cases the plaintiff's recovery is restricted to the
amount of the enrichment. So where a purchaser of land under
a parol contract entered into possession and made improvements
on the land, upon being ejected by the owner, who took ad-
vantage of the Statute of Frauds and repudiated the contract, he
was entitled to recover the value of the improvements to the




5 Bradshaw v. Beard, 12 C. B., N. S., 344; Cunningham v. Reardon, 98
Mass., 538; Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y., 574.
5 Chase v. Corcoran, io6 Mass., 286; Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 Barb.
(N. Y.), 368.
56 Mathews v. Davis, 6 Humph. (Tenn.), 324. But see Wright v. Has-
kell, 45 Me., 489; Welch, v. Lawson, 32 Miss., i7o; Ham v. Goodrich, 37
N. H., i85; Bender v. Bender, 37 Pa., 419.
